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ABSTRACT 
 
This monograph is an account of the theory of fallible probability and of the 
dynamics of degrees of belief.  It discusses the first order subjective theory in which 
first order degrees of belief are expressed by subjective probabilities and are   
updated by conditionalization (Bayes, 1764; Ramsey, 1926), gives an improved 
exposition of the greater part of the author's theory of 'Probability Dynamics' (Nathan, 
2006) which should replace the so-called Probability Kinematics (Jeffrey, 1965), 
resolves the problem of 'New Explanation of Old Evidence' (Jeffrey, 1995), provides a 
Theory of Confirmation, and refutes the 'Principle of Reflection' (Van Fraassen, 
1984). 
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SURVEY  
 
 Part I analyzes the conventional first order method of updating by 
conditionalization which has met a spate of objections.  It proves its soundness and 
thereby rebuts all and any counterexamples, including the Problem of Old Evidence 
and some supposed difficulties with degrees of confirmation. 
Part II proves that there exist no non-vanishing second order probabilities of 
first order epistemic degrees of belief, shows that inconsistencies of higher order 
probability are not eliminated by constraints that have been proposed for this purpose.  
 Part III develops the theory of updating fallible probability, as first given in 
the authors Probability Dynamics (PD)4, which quantifies relative degrees of 
relevance of fallible first order probability distributions by means of an associated 
credence thereby allowing the formation of mergers of probabilistic propositions 
such as P(A)=p and P(A)=q. PD should replace the theory of Probability 
Kinematics (Jeffrey, 1965) which is shown to be inconsistent.  PD is Straight (SPD) 
or Offsetting (OPD).  SPD produces mutually reinforcing straight mergers, while 
mergers of OPD set off conflicting evidences against each other according to their 
relative credence and their correlation.  Also discussed is a process of normalization 
that provides an interpretation of sets of binary evidences of non-uniform credence as 
equi-credible distributions; a cross-credence that determines the credence of 
interacting evidences; and 'indirect' revisions of evidence for one distribution by 
evidence for another.  This Part includes some new material and corrects an error in 
the authors earlier treatment of indirect updating.   
Part IV points out that the Problem of New Explanation of Old Evidence 
cannot be solved by first order methods, resolves it, and disproves the earlier results 
of Jeffrey (1995) and his followers.   
Part V is a PD based theory of confirmation (PDCT). 
Part VI refutes the so-called Principle of Reflection.   
 
 Part I, which discusses first order subjective probability, and Part II are no 
essential prerequisites for Parts III to V.  Part V depends just on Part III. 
 
 
PART I The First Order Theory 
 
1.1 Conditionalization 
 
In the theory of subjective, epistemic, or propositional, probability, agents 
are assumed to be rational in the sense of maximizing their personal gain, and P(A), 
P(B) etc. are an agents degrees of belief in propositions A, B, etc. The theory accepts 
the  pragmatic definition of degrees of belief as agents betting ratios in bets on 
propositions (Bayes, 1763; Ramsey 1926; De Finetti 1970, 1972; Savage 1972; 
Skyrms 1980, 1986, 1987).  Such degrees of belief satisfy the Kolmogorov axioms of 
probability (Gnedenko, 1989). 
 
A proposition is given if it is believed to be true and accepted if it is newly 
given.  Probability P0(A) is P(A) at time t0, P1(A) is P(A) at t1, prior E is the 
collection of probabilities E={P(A),P(AB),P(B)},  
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E0={P0(A),P0(AB),P0(B)}  (1.1) 
 
is E at t0, etc., and, contrary to conventional usage, we define P(A|B) by 
P(A|B)P(B)=P(AB), P0(A|B) by P0(A|B)P0(B)=P0(AB), etc. 2  
Casting myself as a rational agent, my probability P(A) of A is my equitable 
betting ratio for a bet on A, i.e., my equitable price for a bet on A that yields 1 if A 
comes true and nothing otherwise.  My probability P01(A/B) of A conditional on B is 
my equitable betting ratio at time t0 (first subscript of P01) for a bet on A that is on if B 
comes true at some later time t1 (second subscript of P01) and is called off otherwise 
[Ramsey, 1926].  Thus  
 
   P01(A/B)= )(ABPB)/(A)PB(P 0010 + , 
i.e., 
  
     given  E0,      )B|(APA/B)(P 001 =   if  0)(BP0 > , (1.2) 
 
which satisfies the necessary condition P01(A/B)+ /B)A(P01 =1.  t1 must not be 
predetermined, for if it were, then P01(A/B) would vanish identically.3   
Note that 01P (A/B) is my probability of A conditional on B and neither my 
probability of A given B nor my probability of A given my belief that B will come 
true. 
 
Let E10 at t0 (second subscript of E10) be the prior I believe at t1 to have been 
my last update of E, set P10(A|B)=P10(AB)/P10(B), and let P11(A/B) be my probability 
of A at t1 (first subscript of P11) conditional on B at t1 (second subscript of  P11).  With 
these definitions it follows from equ. (2) that  
 
           given E10,     )B|(APA/B)(P 1011 =   if  0)(BP10 > . (1.3) 
 
If, in addition, E10=E0, then P10(A|B)=P0(A|B) and  
 
           given E10,     P11(A/B)=P0(A|B)  if  P0(B)>0. (1.4) 
 
If I accept B at t1>t0 then P11(A/B) is my update P1(A) at t1 of P0(A) at t0.  
Therefore, if I accept B at t1>t0 and E10=E0, then  
 
     given E0,       P1(A)=P0(A|B)  if  P0(B)>0. (1.5) 
 
Equ. (5) has been challenged by a spate of putative counterexamples.  If our 
arguments are sound, equ. (4) admits no exceptions and any conceivable 
counterexample to equ. (5) is reduced to the claim that E10 is not necessarily equal to 
E0.  
The theory under consideration is formal.  It postulates that agents are rational 
and is not otherwise concerned with attributes of agents.  Once degrees of belief have 
been assigned to propositions any further development is purely syntactic.   
New evidence can change my beliefs about the past but cannot revise the past.  
Therefore I know that my acceptance of B at t1>t0 cannot revise my belief E0 at t0 and 
will not revise my belief E10 at t1 of what E0 has been at t0.  Hence E10=E0 and first 
order indirect updating always proceeds by equ. (5). 
This result allows us to take P0(A|B) for P01(A/B). 
 
1.2 The Problem of Old Evidence 
 
The so-called 'Problem of Old Evidence' (Glymour 1980) is an abundantly 
discussed counterexample to equ. (5).  (e.g., by Gaifman, 1985; Earman, 1992; 
Christensen, 1999; Barnes, 1999).  It has led Glymour not just to pessimistic 
conclusions for the prospects of Bayesian confirmation theory but to the conclusion 
that the argument, if sound, is destructive of the whole theory of subjective 
probability.  Earmans discussion includes a survey of several ineffectual attempts to 
resolve the problem and he is likewise skeptical, and so are Bogen (1995)4 and many 
others.  The problem is distinct from the Problem of New Explanation of Old 
Evidence (Jeffrey, 1995) which is discussed in Part IV. 
 This is the Problem:  Suppose that B is first accepted at t0, i.e., suppose that 
P0(B)=1.  Then B is old evidence at t1>t0, and by equ. (5) P1(A)=P0(A|B)=P0(A), 
which has been said to prove that old evidence cannot update P(A), whereas, surely, it 
should be able to update P(A) no less than new evidence.   
 Let us mention one more of its many expositions.  According to Christensen 
there is a fatal flaw in the theory, since P(A|B)=P(A) if P(B)=1 means that if one 
is absolutely certain about ones evidence, it no longer is evidence.  He points out 
that such a B is a tautology and says that we should never believe a nontautology 
with probability 1 anyway.  But this response does not remove the problems sting.  
For it remains true that as P(B) approaches 1, the degree to which B can confirm 
anything becomes vanishingly small. 
To resolve the problem we metaphrase Christensen:  --  As P0(B) increases, 
the degree to which a B accepted at t1 updates P(B), decreases, and if P0(B)=1 then B 
accepted at t1 merely repeats what has been accepted at t0 and is redundant.  In other 
words, P0(B)=1 pre-empts at t0 the repeated acceptance of B at t1.  Moreover, P0(B)=1 
entails that A and B are statistically independent, and a probability of A is not to be 
updated by a B of which it is statistically independent. The supposed problem 
confuses P(B)=1 accepted at t1, with P0(B) given at t0 as a component of prior E0. 
Many discussions of the formation of P0(A|B) do not mention E0 at all.  In 
many others background knowledge is said to be required, and this background 
knowledge, say C, is taken into account by writing P0(A|BC) for P0(A|B).  This is no 
adequate improvement.  In the first place, since C does not stand for just any 
background knowledge but is E0, and, more significantly, B and C (=E0) play different 
roles in P0(A|BC).  While B is a conditioning clause, E0 is given.   
Far from being destructive of the whole theory of subjective probability, 
old evidence is treated by the theory precisely as it should. 
 
If P0(B)=1 and a last earlier prior *E  with 0<P * (B)<1 has been given before, 
then component P0(A) of E0 will have been produced by conditionalization on B at t0 
given *E .  
 
Updating by fallible P1(B) requires a theory of higher order. 
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PART II PHO:  Higher Order Probability  
 
 Degrees of belief that do not satisfy the sum and product rules of the 
probability calculus are inconsistent (Cox, 1946), therefore the only feasible higher 
order theories of degrees of belief may seem to be theories of higher order probability 
(PHO).  Several attempts have been made to provide them (e.g., Soshichi, 1973;  
Skyrms, 1980, 1986;  Gaifman, 1985;  Goodman and Nguyen, 1999).  We prove 5 
 
1) that there exist no positive second order probabilities of epistemic first order 
probabilities;  
2) that PHO produces mergers that are not associative and commutative as they 
would have to be in order to allow a clear semantic interpretation;  
3) that inconsistencies of PHO are not eliminated by constraints which have been 
suggested for this purpose;  
4) that PHO cannot properly account for counter-evidence.  
 
 
 Let P(A) be ∈p (0,1) be predetermined 6, and let an accepted evidence not 
preclude the existence of an ε -neighbourhood )1,0(D ⊂ε  of p in which there exists 
an η >0 such that P[P(A)=q]>η  for every ∈q εD .  This is the case for all epistemic 
propositions A.  Since P(A)=r and P(A)=s are mutually exclusive unless r=s, the 
probability that P(A) is in εD  is the sum of all second order probabilities P[P(A)=q] 
with q∈ εD .  This sum is infinite and not ≤ 1 as required by a probability.  Therefore 
P[P(A)=p] 0≡  if ∈p (0,1).  This shows that there exist no probabilities of epistemic 
propositions but, more generally, that there exist no such absolute degrees of belief, 
but it does not exclude the existence of relative degrees of belief of probabilistic 
propositions. 
The probability of the probability later tonight of rain tomorrow is always nil.7  
This is not true of the probability of the prediction later tonight of rain tomorrow, 
whose range is the alternative rain or no rain. 
 
We prove that Mergers by PHO are not associative and not commutative. 
 
Proof 
Let ai>0 be the second order probability of ei=P(A)=pi, let (a;e) be the PHO-
merger of (a1;e1),,(an;en) with e=P(A)=p, ei=P(A)=pi and a and ai the 
probabilities of e and ei, respectively.  If (a;e) is associative and commutative then 
there exists a function f(.) such that f(x)>0 and )(1 i
n afa Σ= .  Since )(1 i
n afΣ  exceeds 
1 for sufficiently great n this is not generally possible and proves our assertion. 
 
Let B=P1(A)=r, P0(A|B)=s, and 0)(BP0 > .  Then r=0 entails 
'P0(A|B)=P0(A| A )=s=0' and r=1 entails 'P0(A|B)=P0(A|A)=s=1'.  In these two cases 
there holds the identity P0(A|P1(A)=r)=r. 
With B=P1(A)=r as before, on the assumption that P0(A|B) exists and 0<r<1,  
      a) let 0<P0(B)<1 and let B be accepted at t1.  Then P1(A)=r>0 and by equ. (1.5) 
P1(A)=P0(A|B)=P0(AB)/P0(B).  Since r<1, AB=(P(A)=1)∧ (P1(A)=r)=∅  and 
P1(B)=P0(A|B)=0.  It follows that P0[A|P1(A)=r] does not exist, for if it did, it had to 
be simultaneously 0 and r>0. 
      b) let P0(B)=1.  Then P1(A)=r and P1(A)=P0(A|B)=P0(A), independent of B and 
therewith independent of r, in contradiction to P1(A)=r.  Therefore our assumptions 
are false and P0[A|P1(A)=r] does not exist.  
 
 This result is brought about by the existence of a feedback loop in 
'P0(A|P1(A)=r)=s' and the binary nature of the first order P1(A)=r, in which 'P0' 
stands for 'P01'.  Indeed, s is P01(A), and this reflects back on and is equal to 
conditioning phrase 'P1(A)=r', which is consistent if and only if r=s. 
 In any discourse that includes no probabilistic feedback loops, second order 
syntactic probabilities are perfectly in order.  
 
For every evidence (a;e) there should exist a counter-evidence ( a− ;e) such 
that the two do cancel out, but in a theory of higher order degrees of belief it is not 
sufficient just to tack ( a− ;e) on to (a;e), instead, a continuously diminishing a 
should bring about a gradual transition from (a;e) with a>0, via (0;e) to );( ea− , which 
is not possible if a is a probability.   
 
 
 
Part III   Probability Dynamics (PD)   
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
We can simultaneously believe in some degree in propositions such as 
P(A)=p and P(A)=q even if p and q are unequal, but in a first order theory these 
propositions are not compatible unless they are the same.  That there can be no 
absolute second order degrees of belief in such propositions does not preclude the 
existence of relative second order degrees of belief, and that there exist no higher 
order epistemic probabilities does not preclude the feasibility of a higher order theory 
of degrees of belief.  Such a theory should be able to express degrees of fallibility of 
first order degrees of belief, allow their revision, and show how to produce mergers of 
distributions such as ),...,( 1 mpp  and ),...,( 1 mqq  on a common partition of a 
probability space. 
 The theory of Probability Dynamics4 accepts the first order theory of Part I.  It 
introduces a credence κ  of probability distributions as a second order degree of 
belief.  κ  is a relative measure of the credibility, reliability, or relevance of the 
evidence for a distribution.  It ranges from ∞−  to ∞  and is relative to an arbitrary 
reference that remains fixed throughout any one discourse. The credibility of a first 
witness is n times that of a second if his/her evidences E are equivelant to the same E 
independently given in evidence by n second witnesses and, If E='P(A)=p' given in 
evidence by a first witness has credence κ  then the same E given by a second witness 
whose credibility is n times that of the first has credence nκ .  A distribution whose 
credence is nil is irrelevant, increasing credence expresses growing confidence in it, 
and negative credence designates it as counter-evidence.   
Evidences are evidentially independent, or just independent, if they are 
independently given by mutually independent witnesses or report assessments of 
outcomes of pair-wise mutually independent sets of trials.  The credence of n identical 
evidentially independent evidences is proportional to n. 
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An objective credence is readily defined in a frequentist formulation of 
probability.  Consider a coin-tossing game with outcomes H for heads and T for tails, 
and let probability P(H) be the probability of heads.  Given a stationary time series of 
n mutually independent trials, the frequentist theory of probability takes for P(H) the 
relative frequency fn(H) of heads, with increasing confidence in the representation of 
P(H) by fn(H) the greater the number of trials.  In this representation straight PD 
(SPD) makes κ  proportional to n.   
On the other hand, if the outcome of a single toss in the coin-tossing example 
is fallibly reported by two mutually independent observers whose evidences are 
equally credible and one says heads while the other says tails, or if their testimonies 
regarding a given proposition are, respectively, true and false, then the two should 
cancel out.  These are extreme examples of offsetting probability dynamics (OPD). 
 
 
3.2 Elements of Probability Dynamics 
 
 PD operates on probability space {Ω ,Σ ,P}, with Ω  a finite set of discrete 
elementary events and P a function which assigns distributions to field Σ  of Ω  that 
satisfy the laws of probability (Kolmogorov axioms: Gnedenko, 1989).  PD augments 
{Ω ,Σ ,P} by assigning a credence to distributions on Σ .  Distributions confer their 
credence to all functions of their elements.  PD provides a process of normalization 
which interprets sets of probabilities of non-uniform credence as an equi-credible 
distribution. 
  −α Evidence α =[κ ;d;Um] has credence κ and distribution d=(p1,,pm) on 
partition Um of Σ .  Whenever adequate, α  can be abbreviated by α =[κ ;d] and 
[ pp −1,;κ ] by [κ ;p].  Evidences are evidentially independent if they are 
independently provided in equivalent circumstances by pair-wise independent 
witnesses, or report observations of pair-wise mutually independent sets of trials. 
PD is straight (SPD, or just PD) or offsetting (OPD).  SPD merges pair-
wise evidentially independent −α evidences 1α =[ 1κ ;d1], 2α =[ 2κ ;d2] etc. on a 
common partition of Σ , by merging corresponding elements into straight mergers, 
and OPD merges them into offsetting mergers.  SPD-mergers of evidences of 
positive credence are mutually reinforcing, associative and commutative.  OPD-
mergers set off conflicting evidences against each other.  Frequentist SPD applies to 
outcomes of mutually independent trial runs and frequentist OPD applies to 
evidentially independent assessments of outcomes of a single trial run. 
1α ⊕⊕ nα , or { iα |
n
1 }, is the straight merger of 1α ,... , nα  and 1α !...! nα  
is their offsetting merger.  With (qj,1 jq− ) a distribution on {Aj, jA } for j=1,... ,m, let 
us define the set β ={[ 11;qκ ],... ,[ mm q;κ ]}.  Here ),...,( 1 mqq  is an −α distribution on 
some partition Um={A1,... ,Am} if and only if mκκ == ...1  and 11 =Σ j
mq , but a process 
of normalization interprets any set {[ 11;qκ ],... ,[ mm q;κ ]} with non-negative jκ  as an 
−α evidence. 
3.3 Straight Probability Dynamics (SPD) 
 
3.3.1 Straight Mergers 
 
In SPD we prove the rules of merging binary −α evidences of rational-valued 
non-negative credence of non-vanishing sum.  Their extension to real valued credence 
presents no difficulty and will be omitted. 
In a frequentist representation, on partition U2, in a run of ni trials with mi 
successes and ni im−  failures, let us set iκ =ni and pi=mi/ni.  Then κ = inΣ , 
p= ii nm ΣΣ / , and {[ iκ ; ip ]
n
1 }=[κ ;p] with 
 
κ = i
nκ1Σ ;         p= i
n
ii
n p κκ 11 /ΣΣ . (3.1) 
 
Alternatively, let us postulate that the straight merger of n evidentially 
independent equi-credible evidences [κ ;p1],,[κ ;pn] has credence nκ  and a 
probability equal to the average of the merged probabilities, i.e.,  
 
{[κ ;pi] n1 }=[nκ ; n1 i
n p1Σ ]. (3.2) 
 
Accordingly  
 
{[κ ;p] n1 }=[nκ ;p], (3.3) 
 
so that n evidentially independent identical evidences [κ ;p] are equivalent to a single 
evidence of probability p and credence nκ .  We prove that equ. (2) entails equs. (1): 
 
Proof 
Let { nd ⊕];[κ } denote the n-fold merger of [ ];dκ  with itself and let iκ  be ri/si 
with integer ri and si, then by (2)  
 
{[ iκ ;pi]
n
1 } = {[1/ j
n s1Π ;p1]
⊕
Π ≠ j
n
j sr 11 }⊕ ...  ⊕ {[1/ jn s1Π ;pn]
⊕
Π ≠ j
n
nj sr1 }  
 
       = 
j
n
jnjnjj
s
srsr
1
11 ...
Π
Π++Π ≠≠ ; 
 
jnjnjj
j
n
srsr
s
≠≠ Π++Π
Π
...11
1
 
)...( 1
1
1
n
n
n p
s
rp
s
r
++ ]   
 
= [r1/s1+...+rn/sn; ii
nn
p
srsr
κΣ
++ /.../
1
11
] = [ n1Σ iκ ;(1/ i
nκ1Σ ) i
nκ1Σ pi]. 
 
 
In multi-valued PD, let di=(pi1,... ,im) for i=1,,n and d=(p1,... ,pm) be 
distributions on a partition of Σ .  Then iα =[ iκ ,di] confers credence iκ  to all 
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elements pij of di. and α =[ 1κ ;d1]⊕ ,... ,⊕ [ nκ ;dn] is formed by merging 
[ 1κ ;p1j], ... ,[ nκ ;pnj] on U2 into [ jp;κ ] for j=1,... ,m, in accordance with rules (1) of 
binary mergers.  Hence α ={[ iκ ; id ]
n
1 }=[κ ;d] with  
 
κ = i
nκ1Σ ;    pj=(1/ i
nκ1Σ )
n
i 1=Σ iji pκ ; j=1,... ,m (3.4) 
 
An evidence with negative credence is counter-evidence which cancels out 
with its positive counterpart, as in [κ ;p1]⊕ [ κ− ;p1]⊕ [ 2κ ;p2]=[ 2κ ;p2]. Straight 
mergers are associative and commutative.  
 
3.3.2 Homomorphism 
 
A transformation is homomorphic if it transforms all functions of elements of 
a distribution into the same functions of the transformed elements..  Otherwise they 
are heteromorphic.  Mergers are homomorphic if and only if they are associative and 
commutative.  Heteromorphic mergers require rules that go beyond the rules of the 
probability calculus.  Such rules are always somewhat arbitrary.   
 
  Straight mergers are homomorphic by equs. (4), since i
nκ1Σ  and iji
n pκ1Σ  are 
associative and commutative.  
  
    3.3.3   Equivalence 
 
 ];[ dκ  is true with probability p is equivalent to ];[ dpκ . (3.5) 
 
Proof 
Let p=m/n.  Since ];[ dκ ={[ ndn 1|];/κ }, [κ ;d] of probability m/n  is 
equivalent to {[ mdn 1|];/κ }, which is ];/[ dnmκ = ];[ dpκ . 
 
     3.3.4   Indifference 
 
PD expresses indifference to probabilities p1, ... ,pn of a proposition by equi-
credibility  
 
nκκ == ...1  of  [ 1κ ;p1],... ,[ nκ ;pn]. 
 
 
3.4 Normalization 
 
Let Um={A1,,Am} be a partition of Σ , let ];[ jj qκ  on {Aj, jA } be a binary 
−α evidence with jκ >0 and qj=P(Aj) the probability of Aj, and let us define 
β ={ ];[ 11 qκ ,..., ];[ mm qκ }.  PD interprets β  the normalized commutative and 
associative −α evidence N{ β }=[κ ; md ] with credence κ  and distribution 
),...,( 1 mm ppd =  on Um.  N{β } remains to be determined.   
To determine N{ β } we note first that necessarily, if (q1,,qm)=(p1,,pm)=dm 
is a distribution and κκκ === m...1 , then N{ β }= ];[ mdκ . 
α =[κ ;dm] on Um with dm=(p1,,pm) is equivalent to the set of binary 
evidences { ];[ 1pκ ,..., ];[ mpκ } with p1=P(A1) etc., and by the rules of mergers,  
 
      α ={[κ pj; jmjjj δδδ ,...,,...,1 ] m1 }, where 


 =
=
otherwise. 0
;  if 1 ji
ijδ  
 
This suggests an interpretation of β  as −α evidence  
 
N{ β }={[ jκ qj; jmjjj δδδ ,...,,...,1 ] mj 1= }, 
 
which satisfies the noted necessary condition.  N{ β } is seen to be associative and 
commutative in ];[ jj qκ .  By Rules (3.1), 
 
N{ β }= ;/,...,/;[ 11 jjmmjjjj qqqqq κκκκκ ΣΣΣ Um], 
i.e.,  
 
Rules of Normalization 
 
Norm Ν{ }β =[κ ; md ] with distribution ),...,( 1 mm ppd =  on partition 
Um={A1,,Am} of some sample space, of β ={[ 1κ ;q1],...,[ mκ ;qm]} with ];[ jj qκ  on 
{Aj, jA } and 0≥jκ , is given by 
 
jpκ = jjqκ ; jj
m qκκ 1 Σ= . (3.6) 
 
  Probability jp  is the credence-weighted normalized value of jq  and credence 
κ  is a normalizing factor which enforces 1 =Σ jp . 
 
 
3.5 Offsetting Probability Dynamics (OPD) 
 
In a stationary stochastic coin-tossing process, if half the outcomes in 
independent and equally credible successive trials are heads and the other half are 
tails, the result is taken as confirmation for probability 12  of heads, with increasing 
confidence the greater the number of trials.  But if we accept equally credible reports 
concerning the outcome of a single toss and one half assert heads and the other half 
tails, then they should cancel out.  Similarly, if in the epistemic theory two or more 
equi-credible and evidentially independent evidences for the same proposition have 
the same probability they reinforce each other, but if some assert true while an equal 
number assert false, we have learnt nothing and they should cancel out.  Offsetting 
probability dynamics (OPD) is a generalization of these examples. 
1α !! nα  is the OPD-merger of evidentially independent iα ,... , nα , where 
];[ 111 pκα = , etc.  OPD merger [κ ;0]![κ ;1] of the two binary equi-credible 
evidences 1α = ]0;[κ and 2α ]1;[κ=  should have credence nil, and n evidentially 
independent binary evidences [ 1κ ;p], ... ,[ nκ ;p] asserting the same p with respective 
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credence 1κ , ... , nκ  should merge in OPD as they do in SPD. 
OPD merger )(nα( =[ )();( npn ((κ ]= 1α !...! nα  is defined by the following 
postulates:- 
 
Postulates of OPD-Mergers 
 
OP1 In )(nα( = 1α !! nα = )();( npn
((
κ , where iα =[ iκ ;pi]; ii=1, ... ,n; 
increasingly conflicting distributions (p1,,pn) increasingly offset each 
other.  In particular, if n is even then =iα [ iκ ;1] for ni 21,...,1= , 
=iα [ iκ ;0] for nni ,...,121 += , and 
n21
1Σ iκ = i
n κ121 +Σ , then )(nκ
( =0. 
OP2 If p1=...=pn then OPD is SPD. 
OP3 If iκ =0 then )(nα
(  is independent of iα . 
OP4 The elements of )(nα(  are continuous functions of the elements of the 
merged iα . 
OP5 Scaling the credence of all merged evidences by a common factor 
scales the credence of )(nα(  by the same factor and does not affect its 
probability. 
OP6 )]();([ npn ((κ =[ 1κ ;p1]!![ nκ ;pn] is equivalent to 
)](1);([ npn (( −κ =[ 1κ ; −1 p1]!![ nκ ; −1 pn]. 
OP7  )(nα( is associative and commutative in the merged [ iκ ;pi]. 
 
Assuming 0≥iκ , let us determine a measure )(nλ  of the accord of 
[ 1κ ;p1],,[ nκ ;pn] on U2, such that )(nα
( = )]();([ npn ((κ  with 
 
)(np( = )(np =Σ1
n
ii pκ /Σ1
n
iκ ;     )(nκ
( = nn 1)( Σλ iκ ; (3.7) 
 
satisfies the postulates of OPD mergers. 
According to equs. (7), α( (n) has the probability of a straight merger but 
credence nn 1)( Σλ iκ  rather than inκ1Σ   Accord )(nλ  is total and has )(nλ =1 if and 
only if p1=...=pn.  Discord )(1 nλ−  is total if and only if 0)( =nλ .  )(nλ  decreases 
with an appropriately defined credence-weighted dispersion of elements 
[ 1κ ;p1],...,[ nκ ;pn], from 1 when there is no dispersion to 0 when the evidences jointly 
annul each other.   
 
α
( (n)= )([ nκ( ; )(np( ]=[ 11; pκ ]!![ nn p;κ ], with 
 
)(np( = )(np =Σ1
n
ii pκ /Σ1
n
iκ ;   )(nκ
( = )(nλ Σ1n iκ ; (3.8) 
 
yields OPD-mergers that satisfy the Postulates if )(nλ  is given by  
 








ΣΣ=
≥Σ−Σ=
−=
./)(
;0)(;/)]([)]([
);(21)(
11
1
2
1
2
i
n
ii
n
i
n
ii
n
pnp
nnppn
nn
κκ
σκκσ
σλ
 (3.9) 
 
2)]([ nσ  and )(nλ  remain invariant if every pi in these equations is replaced by 
ip−1 .  )(nσ  is a measure of the dispersion of the random variable p that ranges over 
(p1,...,pn) with distribution ( iκκ Σ/1 ,, in κκ Σ/ ).  )(nσ  is the standard deviation of p 
and )(np = ][ pExp  is its average .  Clearly, λ (n)≤1.  It can be shown that λ (n)≥ 0. 
 
In case of equi-credibility, 1κ == nκ =κ ,  
 
λ (n)= 21− ])([ 221 iin pp Σ−Σ , 
 
which is independent of credence, and  
 
)()( npnp =( = in pΣ1 ; )(nκ
( = κλ nn)( . 
 
If n=2, equs. (9) reduce to λ (2)=λ  with  
 
)/(||21 212121 κκκκλ +−−= pp . (3.10) 
 
 
3.6 Correlation Coefficients 
 
Correlation coefficient B)A,(ρ  is a measure of the mutual interaction of A 
and B.  It is determined by E=[P(A),P(AB),P(B)] and defined by 
 
ρ (A,B)= Exp [( −A µ )( −B ν )]/ BσσA =[ Exp −AB µν ]/ BAσσ . 
 
Here Exp=mathematical expectation, µ =Exp[A], ν =Exp[B], and  
 
])A[( 2A µσ −= Exp = 22A µ−Exp ;   Bσ = 22B ν−Exp ; 
 
are standard deviations.  If A and B  are propositions, they are binary, true or false.  In 
this case  
 
µ =P(A), ν =P(B), Exp[AB]=P(AB), 
 
2
Aσ = )AP(A)P( ; 
2
Bσ =P(B) )BP( ; 
 
   B)A,(ρ =[P(AB) P− (A)P(B)] )B)P(B)P(AP(A)P(/ . (3.11) 
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B)A,(ρ  corresponds to E, B)A,(0ρ  corresponds to E0, B)A,(10ρ  corresponds 
to E10, etc.   
 
1− ≤ B)A,(ρ 1≤ .   
 
B)A,(ρ = A)B,(ρ = )BA,(ρ− = B),A(ρ− .   
 
)BA,(ρ →0 if and only P(A|B)→P(A). 8   
 
If P(A) or P(B) = 0 or 1 then 0B)A,( =ρ .   
 
==
→→
)BA,(lim)BA,(lim
1P(A)0P(A)
ρρ 0)BA,(lim)BA,(lim
1P(B)0P(B)
==
→→
ρρ . (3.12) 
 
We prove that )BA,(lim
0P(B)
ρ
→
=0 if 0<P(A)<1:-    
 
B)(A,lim
0P(B)
ρ
→ 0P(B)
lim
→
= )B)P(B)P(AP(A)P(P(A)P(B)]/[P(AB)−  
 
            0P(B)
lim
→
= [ )AP(A)P(/]P(B)P(A))P(AB))/P(BP(B) − =0. 
 
All other relations of equ.(12) now follow at once. 
 
 
3.7 Cross-Credence9 
 
For non-negative 1κ  and 2κ  let ];[ dκ  result from accepting [ 1κ ;d] with 
credence 2κ .  Then 'cross-credence' κ  of 1κ  and 2κ  should satisfy the following 
conditions: 
 
C1 κ =f( 1κ , 2κ ) for some continuously differentiable commutative 
function f(.) of 1κ  and 2κ . 
C2  If 1κ  and 2κ  are scaled by a common factor then κ  is scaled by the 
same factor. 
C3  f(0,x)=f(x,0)=0 for all real x. 
C4  f(∞,x)=x for all real x. 
C5  f(x,x)= 12 x. 
 
Condition C1 is evidently reasonable and C2-C4 are clearly necessary but C5 
is only justified by considerations of simplicity.  C1-C4 entail ' ννν κκκ 21 += ' for 
some negative ν .  We set ν = −1  because we regard it the simplest choice.  Taken 
together with C1-C4, C5 is equivalent to this choice.  Thus 
 
κ/1 = 1/1 κ + 2/1 κ ,  (3.13) 
 
)/( 2121 κκκκκ += . (3.14) 
With non-negative nκκ ,...,1 , let the proposition ' ' ' [ 1κ ;d] is of credence 2κ ' is 
of credence 3κ ' etc. up to nκ ', i.e., [ nκ ;[[ 2κ ;[ 1κ ;d]]]], be equivalent to [κ ;d].  
Then κ  is the cross-credence of 1κ ,, nκ , and it follows from equ. (13) that  
 
Theorems of Cross-Credence 
 
Cross-credence κ  of non-negative 1κ ,, nκ is given by 
 
1/κ = ni 1=Σ 1/ iκ ; .0≥iκ  (3.15) 
 
Next, let d1 and d2 be distributions of probabilities of A and B, respectively, 
with respective credences 1κ  and 2κ , let ];[ 11 dκ  be given, and let the acceptance of 
evidence [ 2κ ;d2] with credence 1κ  produce [κ ;d2].  Then κ  is the unilateral cross-
credence from A to B of 1κ  and 2κ  of equ. (14), except that just that fraction of 1κ  is 
effective in the formation of κ  which expresses the degree of interaction of A and B.  
An adequate expression for this fraction is the magnitude of correlation coefficient 
)BA,(ρ  of A and B.  This transforms κ  of equ. (14) into  
 
*κ =
21
21
|)BA,(|
|)BA,(|
κκρ
κκρ
+
. (3.16) 
 
 
Substitution in equ. (14) of 1|)BA,(| κρ  for 1κ  and 2|)BA,(| κρ  for 2κ  yields 
the bilateral cross-credence  
 
**κ =
21
21|)BA,(|
κκ
κκρ
+
. (3.17) 
 
 
3.8 Updating Fallible Evidence 
 
On partition {A, A }×{B1,,Bm}, given prior  
 
E0={P0(AB1),,P0(ABm)} (3.18) 
 
at t0, let us determine update P10(A) of P0(A) by distribution B1
~d =( )(BP~ 11 ,, )(BP
~
1 m ) 
accepted at t1>t0.  Writing P10(A) for P1(A) of equ. (1.5), then, if )(BP
~
11 =1, 
acceptance of B1
~d  produces P10(A)=P0(A|B).  Therefore acceptance of B1
~d  updates 
P0(A) into P0(A|B1) with probability )(BP
~
11 , into P0(A|B2) with probability )(BP
~
21 , 
etc., i.e., acceptance of B1
~d  updates P0(A) into the mathematical expectation of the 
conditional probability P0(A|B) of equ. (1.5) with B ranging over {B1,,Bm} with 
distribution B1
~d .  Thus 
 
P10(A)= m1Σ )(BP
~
1 j P0(A|Bj), (3.19) 
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whose binary instance is  
 
P10(A)= )(BP
~
1 P0(A|B)+ )B(P
~
1 )B|(AP0 . (3.20) 
 
These are the defining rules of Probability Kinematics (Jeffrey, 1965) which 
go some way toward a dynamic theory.  Yet Probability Kinematics is inconsistent.  
As an infallible P0(A) cannot be updated, it tacitly assumes that P0(A) is fallible, but it 
disregards its degree of fallibility, and it is incomplete because it accepts )(BP~1 j  at t1 
with certainty and thereby equates it with update P1(Bj) of P0(Bj), whereas a higher 
order theory should be able to admit fallible )(BP~1 j  and distinguish them from P1(Bj).  
Update P10(A) of P0(A) produced by Probability Kinematics is the weighted 
sum of conditional first order probabilities P0(A|B1),,P0(A|Bm), with 
)(BP~ 11 ,, 1P
~ (Bm) as respective weights, in contradistinction to the second order 
probabilities discussed in Section 2.2, which are probabilities of probabilities.   
 
 
In Probability Dynamics, prior10 AB0α =[ 0κ ;
AB
0d ] has distribution  
 
            AB0d = ( )AB(P),...,(ABP 010 m , )BA(P),...,BA(P 010 m ) , (3.21) 
 
whose binary instance is  
 
AB
0d = ( ),B(AP(AB),(P 00 )BA(PB),A(P 00 ) . (3.22) 
 
If AB0α  is given, then so are 
A
0α =[ 0κ ;P0(A),P0( A )],
jB
0α =[ 0κ ;P0(Bj),P0( jB )] 
and correlation coefficients )BA,(0 jρ . 
Let us define AB1α = ,[ 1κ ]
AB
1d  as 
AB
0α  with 1κ  for 0κ  and 
AB
1d  for 
AB
0d  with P1 
for P0.  Then prior AB0α  is updated by 
AB
1α  into their merger.   
Next, we determine on }B,...,{B}A{A, 1 m×  the indirect update  
 
=10α ];[ 1010 dκ ;    ))A(P(A),P( 101010 =d , (3.23) 
 
of  
 
=0α ];[ 00 dκ ;         ))A(P),(AP( 0100 =d , (3.24) 
 
by evidence  
 
B
1
~α = ]~;~[ 11 dκ ;          ))(BP
~),...,(BP~(~ 1111 md =  (3.25) 
 
and nothing else accepted at t1, given prior AB0α  at t0 with 
AB
0d  of equ. (21).   
 For this purpose we first form, for j=1,... ,m, the binary update 
=
j
10α ;[ 10
jκ )A(P10
j , )A(P10
j ] of ;[ 0κ )(AP0 , )]A(P0  by ;
~[ 1κ 1P
~ )(B j , 1P
~ )]B( j .  Then 
j
10κ  
is the unilateral cross-credence *κ , equ. (3.16), with 1
~κ  for 1κ , 0κ  for 2κ , and Bj for 
B, i.e., 
  
j
10κ =
01
01
~|)BA,(|
~|)BA,(|
κκρ
κκρ
+j
j . (3.26) 
 
In general, j10κ  depends on j and set {[
1
10κ ; )(BP
~
11 ],... ,[
m
10κ ; 1P
~ (Bm]} is no 
−α evidence.  Therefore we normalize it into −α evidence 
10α =[ 10κ ; ),...(BP 11 , 1P (Bm)], and obtain by Rules (6)  
 
10κ =
m
1∑
j
10κ (P
~
1 Bj);    1P (Bj)=(1/ 10κ )
j
10κ (P
~
1 Bj). (3.27) 
 
Update 10α , equ. (23), of 
A
0α , equ. (24), by 
B
1
~α , equ. (25), is now produced 
with credence 1010 κκ =  and distribution ))A(P(A),P( 101010 =d  of equ. (23) and P10(A) 
is the mathematical expectation Exp[P0(A|B)] of P0(A|B) with B ranging over 
{B1,,Bm} with distribution ( 1P (B1),, 1P (Bm)), i.e., 
 
10α =[ 10κ ; )]A(P(A),P 1010 ;   P10(A)=
m
1Σ 1P (Bj) )B|(AP0 j .  (3.28) 
 
In the binary case (m=2) we set BB1 = , BB2 = , and have 
|)BA,(| 0ρ |)BA,(| 0ρ=  and 110κ = 210κ = 10κ .  Therefore this case requires no 
normalization.  Update 10α , equ. (23), of 0α , equ. (24), by )]B(P
~(B),P~;~[~ 111
B
1 κα =  is 
now given by  
 
10κ =
010
010
~|)BA,(|
~|)BA,(|
κκρ
κκρ
+
; (3.29) 
and 
 
        (A)P10 = )B|(A)PB(P
~B)|(A(B)PP~ 0101 + . (3.30) 
 
This solves the problem of the production of update 10α  of 0α  by 
B
1
~α . 
 
In SPD, prior 0α  is successively updated by 
B
1
~α =[ 1
~κ ; B1
~d ],, B~nα =[ nκ
~ ; B~nd ] 
by first forming merger ]~;~[ dκ = B1
~α ⊕⊕ B~nα  and subsequently updating 0α  by 
]~;~[ dκ .  Since ]~;~[ dκ  is commutative in B1
~α ,, B~nα , so is the resulting update, in 
contrast to the updating process of Probability Kinematics which is not commutative 
but is claimed to have commutative variants [cf. Field, 1978; Lange, 2000; Wagner, 
2002, 2003; Hawthorne, 2004]. 
 
Probability Kinematics emerges from Probability Dynamics as 1
~κ ∞→ , but 
this limiting case makes update P10(B) of P0(B) identical to (B)P
~
1 , whereas the two 
should generally be distinct.  It follows that Probability Kinematics is unsound. 
If both 1
~κ  and 2
~κ  tend to infinity then ]~;~[ pκ = ]~;~[ 11 pκ ⊕ ]~;~[ 22 pκ  is indefinite 
and depends on how this is brought about.  For example, if n=2 and 1~κ → 2~κ  as 
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1
~κ ∞→  then )~~(~ 2121 ppp +→ , but if 1~κ → 32 2~κ  as 1~κ ∞→  then p~ → 231132 ~~ pp + .  
Therefore PD does not confer its commutativity to Probability Kinematics.   
The same conclusions follow from the observation that the acceptance of 
)](BP~;~[κ  with credence κ~ =∞  means an acceptance of )(BP~  with certainty, but both 
)(BP~1  and )(BP
~
2  cannot be certain unless they are equal. 
 
   
3.9 Probability Dynamics and Truth 
 
PD is a theory whose object is the provision of estimates of probabilities from 
fallible evidence.  Epistemic PD need not be more than coherent and reasonable.  The 
verity of epistemic PD is relative to its assumptions.  For example, criteria of 
optimality are always somewhat arbitrary.   
Frequentist PD is applied in descriptions of reality.  It sets out with 
probabilities and credence resulting from observation reports, and its conclusions 
should be as free of arbitrary assumptions as possible. 
 
 
 
 
PART IV   New Explanation of Old Evidence 11, 12 
 
4.1 The Problem 
 
On Ω = }B{B,}AA,{ ×  with A an hypothesis and B an evidence (not to be 
confounded with evidences E and α  of Parts I and III), let  
 
 
A
A
BB






=
dc
ba
α
 (4.1) 
 
be a distribution with probabilities P(AB)=a , )BP(A=b , )BAP(=c , )BAP(=d .   
Jeffrey (1995) discusses the problem of the transformation of such an initially 
given defective distribution α  into a repaired distribution  
 
 α(  = 







dc
ba
((
((
 , (4.2) 
 
by the subsequent independent discovery that A implies B.  In this problem of old 
evidence and new explanation he obtains by methods of first order probability and 
probability kinematics, that  
 
 α(  = 




 +
dc
ba 0
. (4.3) 
 
The more general case of probable old evidence and new explanation is the 
subject of several papers by Wagner (1997 et seq.) which are not on the right track.   
If b=0 in α  of equ. (1) then A implies B, and if b>0 then α  is not compatible 
with an implication of B by A, and it is possible to proceed only if α  is fallible, but 
this is not within the scope of a first order theory.   
We apply the methods of PD and obtain results which do not sustain those of 
Jeffrey and his followers. 
   
 
4.2 The Solution 
 
Let A→B be a conditional implication which implies B if A is true and is 
evidentially neutral toward B otherwise.  Let evidence 
   
 β = [κ ;α ] = [κ ; 





dc
ba
] (4.4) 
 
be given and let us accept constraint  
 
 β~  = [κ~ ;P(A→B)]. (4.5) 
 
Then, given β , an acceptance of β~  produces  
 
             β(  = ;[κ( α( ] = [κ( ; 




 +
dc
ba 0
];    κ( = )~/(~ κκκκ + . (4.6) 
Proof 
 
The imposition of A→B on α  1) does not affect c and d since, by 
definition, A→B is inactivated if B is false, 2) transforms b into 0, because A→B 
is true if A is true if and only if B is true, and 3) replaces a by a+b since 
(a+b)+c+d=1.  Therefore α( is given by equ. (3).  κ(  is cross-credence )~/(~ κκκκ +  of 
κ~  and κ , which completes the proof. 
 
The acceptance of β(  revises β  into their merger   
 
1β = ];[ 11 ακ = ββ
(
⊕ =[ )( κκ (+ ;(1/ )( κκ (+ )(κα ακ ((+ )]. (4.7) 
 
This solves our problem. 
 
 
4.3     Discussion 
 
a) 1β  of equ. (7) retains α  (as part of β ) in contrast with first order theories 
which cannot simultaneously accommodate both α  and α~  and are thereby driven to 
abandon α , although they continue to make use of its elements.  The root of the 
matter is the inability of first order theories to form mergers. 
 
b) If ∞→)/~( κκ  then κκ →( , 1κ →2κ , and 1α → ( αα
(
+ ).  (κ~ κ/ )→0 
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inactivates the imposition of constraint β~  of equ. (5) and causes 1β  to tend towardβ , 
as it should, because (κ~ κ/ )=0 means that no constraints are imposed on α .  The 
imposition of [κ~ ;P(A→B)] on α  retains α  when it produces 1β :  The problem is 
not how to repair a defective distribution but how to incorporate new evidence. 
 
c) In equ. (7) 1α  is  
 
 
               1α = (1/ 1κ ) 




++
++
dc
bba
)~()~(
~)~(
κκκκ
κκκκ
;         1κ = κκ
(
+ . (4.8) 
 
The resulting probability of A conditional on B is  
 
 
P1(A|B)=P1(AB)/P1(B)=
cba
ba
+++
++
))~/(~(
))~/(~(
κκκ
κκκ . (4.9) 
  
P1(A|B) increases with κκ /~  from P1(A|B)=P(A|B) = )/( caa +  at (κ~ κ/ )=0 up to 
)/()( cbaba +++  at (κ~ κ/ )=∞ .  If )/( κκ( >0 then P1(A|B)>P(A|B).  Acceptance of 
constraint β~  is seen to increase P(A|B). 
 
d) According to the theorem of equivalence, equ. (3.5), acceptance of constraint 
[κ~ ;P(A→B)=p] instead of β~  of equ. (5), merely replaces κ~  in [κ~ ;P(A→B)] by 
pκ~ .   
 
 
4.4 A Generalization  
 
Finally, let us define on Ω = B,...,{B}AA,{ 1× n} evidences ];[ ακβ =  and  
];[ iii ακβ =  for ni ,...,1= , with distributions  
 
 





=
ni
ni
aaa
aaa
2221
1111
......
......
α ; 




 Σ
=
ni
j
i aaa
a
2221
1
......
0...00...0
α .    (4.10) 
 
To keep the exposition simple we restrict the sequel to straight mergers.  It then 
follows by the same reasoning as before and a little algebra that the successive 
imposition on β  of n constraints Ci=[ iκ ;P(A→Bi)] with i=1,,n, generates the 
commutative evidence  
 
β( =[ 11;ακ( ] ⊕⊕ ... [ nn ακ ;( ]=[ iκ(Σ ; 





n
n
bb ...
...
1
1 µκµκ ]; (4.11) 
 
with iia κµ
(ΣΣ= /  by definition and )~/(~ κκκκκ += iii
( ; ni ,...,1= .  An imposition of 
constraints Ci with respective probabilities pi, replaces every iκ  by iip κ .  The 
resulting revision of β  is 1β = β β
(
⊕ . 
PART V PDCT:  The Theory of Confirmation 
 
 The first order theory defines the inductive support or degree of 
confirmation of 'hypothesis' A by evidence B accepted at t1, as excess C10 of the 
updated probability P1(A) of A over its prior probability P0(A), i.e.,  
 
C10=P1(A) 0P− (A),  (5.1) 
 
and by equ. (1.5), given E0 of equ. (1.4), 
 
C10=P0(A|B) 0P− (A). (5.2) 
 
PD provides two different definitions of degrees of confirmation.  The first 
defines the degrees of confirmation  0010 /)( κκκ −  for credence and P10(A) P− 0(A) 
for probability.  The second defines degree of confirmation K10(A,B) of 
0α =[ ;0κ P0(A)] by 
B
1
~α = (B)]P~;~[ 11κ  given prior 
AB
0α =[ 0κ ;
AB
0d ], with 
AB
0d  of equ. 
(3.22), as the excess of the product of credence and probability of update 
10α =[ 10κ ;P10(A)] over that of prior 0α , both divided by 0κ  as reference credence.  
In this second definition, if 0α  is updated by accepting 
B
1
~α  and nothing else, 
then  
 
K10(A,B) =λ [ 10κ / 0κ ]P10(A) 0(κ− / 0κ )P0(A), 
 
with λ  the measure of accord of Section 3.5, and by (3.29) and (3.30), 
 
K10(A,B) = λ
010
10
~|)BA,(|
~|)BA,(|
κκρ
κρ
+
[ (B)P~1 P0(A|B)+ )B(P
~
1 P0(A| B )] 0P− (A).  
                  (5.3) 
 
In straight PDCT λ =1, and if ∞=)/~( 01 κκ  and (B)P
~
1 =1, then K10(A,B) 
reduces to C10 of equ. (1).  In binary offsetting PDCT , by equ. (3.10) with P0(A) for 
p1, P10(A) for p2, 0κ  for 1κ , and 1~κ  for 2κ , 
 
           λ  = 1 2− |P0(A −) P10(A)| 10 ~κκ / )~( 10 κκ + .             (5.4) 
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Part VI  The Principle of Reflection  
 
6.1 The Principle 
 
The so-called Principle of Reflection (Van Fraassen, 1984) has brought 
about many discussions pro and contra (e.g. Van Fraassen, 1989, 1999 13; Gaifman, 
1986; Maher, 1992; Kvanvig, 1994; Green et al., 1994; Hild, 1998; Loewer, 1998, and 
many others).  It consists of a verbal and of a mathematical principle.  We show that 
the verbal principle does not follow from the mathematical version, prove that both 
are false, and analyse Van Fraassens attempted proof. 
The mathematical version purports to make second order theories of 
probability consistent by imposing the constraint discussed in Section 2.4.  Our 
discussion illustrates pitfalls of inadequate formalizations and of mistaken conclusions 
from so-called Dutch book  heads I win, tails you lose  betting schemes. 
 
According to the Verbal Principle of Reflection  
 
R1 [An] agent's present subjective probability for proposition A, on the 
supposition that his subjective probability for this proposition will equal r at 
some later time, must be equal to this same number r."   
 
Van Fraassen claims that this principle is equivalent to  
 
 
R2 The Special Mathematical Principle of Reflection,  
 
 rrpat+x
a
t == ])A(|A[P , where 
a
tP  is agent a's credence function at time t, x is 
any non-negative number, and ( p rt+x
a ( )A = ) is the proposition that at time t+x 
the agent will bestow degree r of credence on the proposition A.   
 
R2 is ambiguous, but if we read ])A(|A[P rpat+x
a
t =  as an agents probability 
of A at time t conditional on its value r at time xt + , and introduce a prior, we obtain 
for it in my notation  
 
R3 Given P0 ](A)P[ 1 r= =1 and prior E0, then ](A)P|A[P 10 r= =r, 
 
i.e., at t0, given E0, an agents subjective probability of A conditional on his subjective 
probability of A being r at some later time t1, is equal to r.  R3 is a special case of R4.   
 
If ])A(|A[P rpat+x
a
t =  were meant to say that 
a
tP  is the probability of A at time 
t given  rpat+x =)A(  (our P1(A)=r), it would not be a conditional probability but 
probability P0[P1(A)=r.→A] of the conditional, which vanishes identically if r<1 
since [P1(A)=r.→A] is true if and only if r=1.  
 The probability of valid propositions (tautologies) is one, but probabilities of 
epistemic propositions are neither nil nor one.  Therefore conditionalization is of little 
interest if P0 ](A)P[ 1 r= =1. 
 
R4 The Mathematical Principle of Reflection 
 
Given E0=P0 ](A)P[ 1 r= &P0[A∧ .P1(A)=r] and 0<P0 ](A)P[ 1 r= <1, then 
 
](A)P|A[P 10 r= =r. 
 
Van Fraassen is right to devote to it the greater part of his considerations to 
R4, although this is not the way he puts it. 
 
 
6.2 Discussion 
 
R4 is trivially true if r=0 or 1.  Therefore we exclude these instances from our 
discussion and assume that 0<r<1.  For the moment let us disregard that P0 ](A)P[ 1 r=  
is always nil for epistemic A (Section 2.2). 
In R2, A is conditional on ( rpat+x =)A( ) and in R3 it is conditional on 
 r=(A)P1 .  In R1 the supposition that the probability of A will equal r at some 
later time is ambiguous.  If  p rt+x
a ( )A =  is the conditional 0P (A|B) then it is not the 
agents (unconditional) probability of A as claimed in R1, and if it is the indicative 
B)|A(P1  it is the agents probability of A at t1 and not at t0.  In both cases it has 
nothing to do with reflections.  Nor does R1 follow from R2 and R3.  A fortiori it 
does not follow from R4.   
P0(A|B) is the probability of A at t0 on the belief with probability P0(B) that B 
will be accepted at t1, whereas in P1(A|B) B has been accepted at t1.  It follows that  
  
P0[P1(A|B)=P0(A|B)]=P0(B).  
 
Van Fraassen appears to have mistakenly replaced the P0(B) on the right-
hand side of this equation by 1.   
P0[A|P1(A)=r] in which ](A)P[P 10 r= =p on one hand and P0[A|P1(A)=s] in 
which ps −== 1](A)P[P 10  on the other, are not mutually exclusive for any 10 ≤≤ r , 
10 ≤≤ s , and 10 ≤≤ p .  Therefore according to R4 sr =  if sr ≠ .  This disproves 
R4.   
Moreover, Van Fraassen has run into the constraint of Section 2.4, which 
shows that there exists no non-vanishing P0(A|B) with B=P1(A)=r.  It follows that 
R1-R4 are all invalid. 
 
 
6.3 A Purported Coherence Proof  
 
Several coherence proofs of the mathematical principle of reflection by 
'Dutch book' schemes have been proposed (Goldstein, 1983; Van Fraassen, 1984; 
Gaifman, 1986).  Van Fraassen's and Gaifmans proofs are highly informal.  Van 
Fraassens proof, reduced to essentials, augmented where necessary and in a more 
general setting which better displays the issue, amounts to this: 
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Let A be an event whose outcome, true or false, is first accepted at t2>t1>t0, set 
B='P1(A)=r', b= )/BA(P01 =P0( A |B), )1( rb −−=δ =r P− 0(A|B), and assume that 
10 << r  and P0(B)>0. 
 At t0 punter M knows P0(A), P0(B), P0(AB), and r, and places with bookie N 
the following three bets: 
Bet (a) pays 1 if BA  comes true at t2; 
bet (b) pays b if B  comes true at t1; 
bet (c) pays δ  if B comes true at t1. 
If B comes true at t1 bookie N buys back bet (a) at its updated price (1− r). 
The bets cost Pa=P0( A B)=P0(B)b;  Pb= )B(P0 b;  Pc=P0(B)δ .  Therefore 
punter M pays bookie N at t0 a total of δ(B)P0+=++=Σ bPPPP cba .  If B  comes true at 
t1 then M loses PΣ − b=P0(B)δ , and if B comes true at t1 he loses likewise 
δδ (B)P)1( 0=−−−Σ rP .  P0(B)>0 by assumption.  Therefore δ =0, for otherwise, 
depending on the predetermined sign of δ , either M or N makes a positive gain 
whatever the outcome (the bet is a 'Dutch book';  the case is incoherent).  Since 
P0(B)>0 by assumption, δ =0 if and only if r=1−b.  But b−1 = )]B(P|A[P 00  and 
therefore δ =0 if and only if )]B(P|A[P 00 =r, which proves R4.   
The Proof shows that ])A(P|A[P 10 r= =r if 0<r<1 is a necessary condition, 
but another necessary condition is  ])A(P|A[P 10 r= =0 if r>0 (Section 2.2) with 
which it is not compatible. 
 
The popularity of Dutch-book proofs stems from their mathematically 
undemanding nature.  They can give necessary conditions but cannot give sufficient 
conditions, and they are no existence proofs.  Dutch-book vulnerability disproves 
hypotheses but examples of Dutch-book invulnerability do not prove them. 14 
 
According to the mathematical principle of reflection the imposition of 
 ])A(P|A[P 10 r= =r is a necessary and sufficient constraint for the consistency of 
second order probability.  According to the constraint of Section 2.4, the 
inconsistency that (A)P|A[P 10 =r] is simultaneously 0 and r>0 if 0<P0(B)<1, cannot 
be resolved by the imposition of one of  (A)P|A[P 10 =r]=r>0 and 
 (A)P|A[P 10 =r]=0, unless the rules of probability are suspended, for if one of them 
is imposed then, by the rules, the other contradicts it.  
The Proof is otherwise unsound because condition P0(B)>0 is necessary for 
the inference from P0(B)δ =0 that δ =0, but P0(B)=P0[P1(A)=r] 0≡  for epistemic A 
and pre-determined positive r (Section 2.2).   
 The Proof has failed. 
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2   Instead of E={P(A),P(AB),P(B)} etc., my earlier paper on Probability Dynamics (Nathan, 
2006) makes use of & as an enumerative connective, as in E=P(A)&P(AB)&P(B) etc. 
 
3    A  is A¬ , etc.  
   
4   It seems that on p. 80 of Bogen (1995) the phrase 'priors (1) and (3) ... are ... 1'  should read  
--  priors (2) and (3) ... are ... 1'  --. 
 
5   See (Nathan, 2006). 
 
6   ∈p (0,1) stands for 0<p<1. 
 
7   The sentence is prompted by Gaifman's (1986) quotation from a cartoon in The New 
Yorker, "There is now 60% chance of rain tomorrow, but, there is 70% chance that later 
this evening the chance of rain tomorrow will be 80%."   
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If probabilities are specified to within an integer multiple of some ∆ , then the 
probability of the probability later tonight does not have to vanish but tends to nil with ∆ .  
Similarly, my watch will sometimes show the exact time but the probability that it will do 
so at some predetermined moment is nil. 
 
8   In our binary case, B)A( ,ρ =0 if and only if A and B are independent.  In the general case, 
correlation coefficient )(x,yρ  of random variables x and y is nil if x and y are 
independent, but the converse is not true (Feller, 1957;  Gnedenko, 1989).   
 
9   In (Nathan, 2006) I call it a compound credence. 
 
10  In  (Nathan, 2006) I call it a co-evidence. 
 
11   A paper comprised of an earlier version of this Section was rejected by Synthese, on the 
strength of a review which asserts that in (Nathan, 2006) the author proceeds to shill for 
his own theory ...  his theory amounts to ...  slapping a real number ...  on a probability 
distribution ...  relative degrees ...  whatever that may mean ...   arrogant assertions, 
etc. For a detailed account see  http://review.amosnathan.com/ 
12   The prerequisites of this Section are a few simple relations of PD. 
 
13   He here refers to it as a much maligned principle. 
 
14   Sufficiency requires invulnerability to all conceivable Dutch books. 
 
